

SECRET

Guidance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence

As pointed out in the President's Directive of December 21, 1970, subject "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements," machinery now exists to protect all classified information. It is evident that unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence involve either careless or deliberate failure to comply with regulations and procedures already in effect. Further, with respect to sources and methods, widespread discussion of this subject, some of it unavoidable but much of it gratuitous, seems to have conveyed an impression in some parts of the Government that there is little, if anything, that is not known to the public. Nothing could be further from the truth. The protection of intelligence sources and methods continues to be of vital importance to our intelligence effort. The true origin of many categories of intelligence information to be used in public release or debate must be disguised and the use of all such information must be duly authorized. The responsibility for authorizing release and for devising proper disguise rests with the originating agency.

The President's Directive of December 21, 1970, refers to the statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The National Security Act of 1947 specifically states:

"... And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;"

✓ This is a unique statutory responsibility and recognizes that protection of intelligence sources and methods is a professional intelligence matter. It is not to be expected that all consumers of intelligence, policy makers and others would recognize or be fully alert to potential danger to intelligence sources and methods resulting from release of intelligence. Consequently, it is believed that the intelligence community should take the leading role within their departments and agencies.

SECRET

... is pointed out in the President's  
Directive of December 21, 1970,  
information.

It is recognized that  
unauthorized disclosures  
of classified intelligence may  
~~often~~ involve thoughtlessness  
in the application of regulations  
and procedures already  
in effect. Further, with  
respect to sources and  
methods, ----- public, the  
protection ----- originating  
agency.

The Pres ----- disclosure:

It is to be expected -----  
departments and agencies.

Mr Helms -  
Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060010-0

In reworking the first sentence of the original para 2 per your instructions, two things came to mind - there would be considerable similarity between the first sentences of paras 1 and 2 and also that the first sentences of both paras 1 and 2 were about non-intelligence items while the second seconds of each para dealt with intelligence points. I thought it might be better to reorganize so that para 1 is non-intelligence and para 2 is all intelligence. I wonder if you might glance at the attached revision along that line so see if it might not better do the job (I also changed the original word "asks" in the first sentence para 1 to "directs") You will recognize the other changes in paragraphs 3 and 4 per the discussion in your office.

I am a bit uncomfortable with the word "assume" in the second sentence of the new para 1 - perhaps "believe" (even though we have no basis for such belief) or "am certain" or "am sure" might be better.

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060010-0

Coffey

1. In the President's memorandum of December 21, 1970, subject as above,

he directs that existing regulations and procedures designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary, and he calls for an adequate security review of all public disclosures with important security connotations. I ~~assume~~<sup>would hope</sup> that these actions have been initiated and that <sup>any</sup> and that deficiencies which come to light will be corrected.

2. The President, noting the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community. I am submitting to members and observers of the United States Intelligence Board  proposed <sup>guidance</sup> ~~guidelines~~ ILLEGIB to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent of the President's directive.  This guidance, a copy of which is attached, states, ILLEGIB in paragraph 4a, that ~~this~~<sup>the</sup> responsibility of the intelligence chiefs of affected departments and agencies for assessing risks to intelligence sources and methods involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated, and suggests ways in which this can be accomplished.

3. May I urge that you use your principal intelligence or security officers to work out appropriate procedures to enable them to assist in an advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or your principal officers may contemplate making and which might have security implications? It is my hope that the proposed ~~xxx~~ guidelines may be made applicable to all affected departments and agencies even though some of them may not be represented on the United States Intelligence Board.

4. It would be most helpful if you could let me have your reaction to these proposals and any additional comments you wish to make, so that I will be able to report to the President in the near future what we are doing to carry out his instructions.

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060010-0

2. In keeping with the President's  
charge, assume everyone  
is reviewing procedures &  
will correct deficiencies  
(look at Pres wording)

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060010-0

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director, U. S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Administrator, National Aeronautics  
and Space Administration

SUBJECT : Disclosures of Classified Information and  
Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements

1. In the President's memorandum of December 21, 1970, subject as above, he asks that existing regulations designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary, and calls for an adequate security review of all public disclosures with important security connotations. The President, noting my statutory responsibilities as Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community.

2. I have instituted a review within the Central Intelligence Agency of existing regulations and procedures and will see to it that any deficiencies that come to light are corrected. Additionally, I am submitting to members and observers of the United States Intelligence Board a set of proposed guidelines to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent of the President's directive. A copy of these proposals, which essentially update somewhat similar guidance promulgated through USIB in 1960, is attached. This guidance states, in paragraph 4a, that the responsibility of

SECRET



SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060010-0

the intelligence chiefs of affected departments and agencies for assessing risks to intelligence sources and methods involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated, and suggests ways in which this can be accomplished.

3. <sup>May</sup> I urge that you use your principal intelligence or security officers to work out appropriate procedures to enable them to assist in an ~~educational~~ and advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or your principal officers may contemplate making and which might have security implications. Although not all addressees of the President's memorandum and of this one are members of the USIB, I ~~believe~~ the proposed guidelines should be essentially applicable to all affected departments and agencies.

4. <sup>It would be most helpful</sup> ~~I would appreciate~~ it if you could let me have your reaction to these proposals and any additional comments you wish to make so that I will be able to report to the President in the near future what we are doing to carry out his instructions.


Richard Helms  
Director

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060010-0

SECRET

SECRET



## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director, U. S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Administrator, National Aeronautics  
and Space Administration

SUBJECT : Disclosures of Classified Information and  
Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements

1. In the President's memorandum of December 21, 1970, subject as above, he asks that existing regulations designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary, and calls for an adequate security review of all public disclosures with important security connotations. The President, noting my statutory responsibilities as Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, charged me with providing guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community.

2. I have instituted a review within the Central Intelligence Agency of existing regulations and procedures and will see to it that any deficiencies that come to light are corrected. Additionally, I am submitting to members and observers of the United States Intelligence Board a set of proposed guidelines to assist the intelligence community in carrying out the intent of the President's directive. A copy of these proposals, which essentially update somewhat similar guidance promulgated through USB in 1960, is attached. This guidance states, in paragraph 4a, that the responsibility of

SECRET





SECRET

the intelligence chiefs of affected departments and agencies for assessing risks to intelligence sources and methods involved in deliberate disclosures should be delineated, and suggests ways in which this can be accomplished.

3. I urge that you use your principal intelligence or security officers to work out appropriate procedures to enable them to assist in an educational and advisory capacity in connection with releases which you or your principal officers may contemplate making and which might have security implications. Although not all addressees of the President's memorandum and of this one are members of the USIB, I believe the proposed guidelines should be essentially applicable to all affected departments and agencies.

4. I would appreciate it if you could let me have your reaction to these proposals and any additional comments you wish to make so that I will be able to report to the President in the near future what we are doing to carry out his instructions.

Richard Helms  
Director

18 JAN 1971

Att

ORIGINATOR:

(Date)

DD/S:JWC:llc (12 Jan 71)

Distribution:

Orig - SecState

- 1 - Ea Following Adse
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DD/I
- 1 - DD/P
- 1 - DD/S&T
- 1 - OGC
- 1 - D/Sec
- 1 - D/DCI/NIFE
- 2 - DD/S (one w/h)



John W. Coffey  
Deputy Director  
for Support

25X1

SECRET